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Since the Three Mile Island accident, an important focus of pressurized water reactor (PWR) transient analyses has been a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA). In 2002, the discovery of thinning of the vessel head wall at the Davis Besse nuclear power plant reactor indicated the possibility of an SBLOCA in the upper head of the reactor vessel as a result of circumferential cracking of a control rod drive mechanism penetration nozzle-which has cast even greater importance
. The main conclusion is that the current emergency operating procedures for Westinghouse reactor design are adequate for these kinds of sequences, and they do not need to be modified.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vessel head wall thinning found in the reactor at the Davis Besse nuclear power plant (NPP) on February 16, 2002, raised a safety issue regarding vessel structural integrity; see Fig. 1 and Refs. 1 through 4. Circumferential cracking of the penetration nozzle of the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) could cause a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) at the pressure vessel upper head in a pressurized water reactor (PWR).
As part of participation in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency Rig of Safety Assessment (OECD/NEA ROSA) * E-mail: cesar.queral@upm.es project and the Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP), the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid has performed a broad analysis of an upper-head SBLOCA with high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) failed in a Westinghouse PWR:
1. In the first stage, simulation of OECD/NEA ROS A Test 6.1 was performed and compared extensively to the experimental results.
2. In the second stage, transients similar to those of OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 were simulated with the TRACE model of the Almaraz NPP Unit 1 (Westinghouse three-loop design). This analysis took into account different accident management actions and conditions in order to check their suitability. 
II. EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES RELATED TO SBLOCA SEQUENCES
In this kind of sequence, i.e., SBLOCA with HPSI failed, the operators must follow several emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The main tasks of the EOPs corresponding to the Westinghouse reactor design are described in Fig. 2 and Ref. 5:
4. In EOP ES-1.2, the operator cools and depressurizes the primary system, opening the steam dump valves, or if that is not possible, the operator opens the steam generator relief valves at the secondary side, making sure that the cooling of the RCS is close to 55 K/h.
It is important to comment on some considerations with respect to the two main operator actions: RCP trip and cooling and depressurizing the primary system by means of steam generators:
1. RCP trip: The need to review the manual RCP trip conditions during an SBLOCA was an issue that arose as a result of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. Westinghouse analyzed this issue for SBLOCA sequences with and without HPSI (see Refs. 6, 7, and 8), and the main conclusions were the following: a. If the HPSI is available, the RCP must be tripped at the beginning of SBLOCA sequences in order to avoid worse consequences following a delayed RCP trip.
b. If the HPSI is not available, it is better to not trip the RCPs in order to cool the core with a high mass flow.
In other designs like the current Siemens reactors, EPR and APIOOO, there is an automatic trip coincident with the safety injection system (SIS) demand, regardless of HPSI availability. 911 In the French reactor design there is also a manual trip in the A1.2 procedure (corresponding to the LOCA sequence). 12 2. Primary-side cooling: If the RCS is in saturation conditions, it is possible to obtain the equivalence of a 55 K/h cooling rate (following EOP ES-1.2, as mentioned earlier) in bars per hour, from Figs. 3 and 4 (it must be noted that this equivalence is valid only in saturation conditions). In other designs like the current Siemens reactors and EPR, the cooling rate during an SBLOCA is 100 K/h, and cooling is performed automatically by the protection system. 910 In the APIOOO there is no secondary-side depressurization, and the primaryside depressurization is performed using an automatic depressurization system (ADS) with four stages, which is necessary when the core makeup tank is below 70% (Refs. 11 and 13). In the APIOOO design, EOPs direct the operator to actuate the normal residual heat removal system (RHRS) in order to avoid the actuation of the fourth ADS stage.
14 For the French reactor design, the operators must follow procedure Al. 1 (small primary system break) during an SBLOCA. The objective of this EOP is to cool the RCS with the steam generator to conditions that enable implementing the RHRS, which it is similar to EOP ES-1.2.
If the accident management actions included in EOP E-0, EOP E-l, and EOP ES-1.2 are not enough to avoid core damage or if there is an error or delay in operator actions, then it is possible to get inadequate core cooling (ICC) conditions; see Refs. 15 through 20 for more details. In this case the operators must follow Status Tree F.0.2 (core cooling) and EOP FR C.l (response to ICC) and EOP FR C.2 (response to degraded core cooling). The status tree that is related to the critical function of core cooling is F.0.2 (Westinghouse design); see Fig. 5 . This status tree directs the operators to the function recovery guideline (FRG) that must be used depending on the values of several parameters. In this case Status Tree   400  375  350  325  300  275  250  225  200  175  150  125  100  75  50 In EOP FR C.2, the operator will cool down the primary side with a maximum cooling rate of 55 K/h (as in EOP ES-1.2), and in EOP FR C.l, the operator will fully open all secondary-side relief valves. In several simulations it has been observed that the cooling rate with full opening is near 300 K/h.
The generic probabilistic risk analysis of the French reactor design (see Ref. 12) mentions that in the event of failure of HPSI during LOCA sequences, the operator will trigger an accelerated cooling by the steam generator (task included in procedure Ul), making it possible to attain low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) operation conditions (similar to EOP FR C.l). The time available for this operation is estimated to be 1 h. 2. The old VESSEL component was translated to the TRACE model, and the temperature in the upper head of the vessel was adjusted to the measured one (-586 K). The REFLOOD model was activated.
3. The total mass flow was adjusted in the primary loops using friction coefficient (FRIC) parameters and the rated head in the RCP The mass flow rate from the downcomer to the upper head of the vessel was adjusted to the specified one (0.3% of the downcomer vessel total mass flow).
4. Volume-versus-height plots were checked with respect to the facility data, and all the volume and height discrepancies were corrected. 5. A new two-dimensional model of the pressurizer was created to avoid excessive cooling in the upper cells of the model during long quasi-steady-state transients, which was a problem with the earlier model. Also, stabilization of the pressurizer level and pressure control systems was included to adequately fix the steady state. Finally, new, more detailed proportional and base heaters were also added.
6. Heat losses and pressure drops of the whole model were adjusted. The OECD/NEA ROSA project, which started in 2005 by agreement among the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), OECD/NEA, and 13 member countries, has conducted an SBLOCA test (Test 6-1, SB-PV-09 at JAEA). This test simulates a PWR vessel top-break SBLOCA assuming a total failure of the HPSI with a break size equivalent to a 1.9% cold-leg break; see Table I for more details on the sequence. The objective of the test is to study the effect of accident management action and to provide integral test data for assessment and development of advanced analytical codes.
OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6-1 was conducted on November 17, 2005, using the LSTF at JAEA. At the beginning of the test, a rather large break and core uncovery caused fast primary depressurization, which resulted in the primary pressure being far lower than the steam generator secondary-side pressure when an accident management action was initiated by fully opening of the steam generator relief valves following the detection of high CET temperature (T > 623 K). The peak CET temperature appeared at the center. The accident management action was ineffective in the early stage until the steam generator secondary-side pressure decreased to the primary pressure. The LSTF core protection system automatically decreased the core power to 10% of the decay power level as the maximum fuel rod surface temperature exceeded the core protection limit (T > 958 K).
As can be seen in Figs. 9 through 13, the test was correctly simulated with the TRACE model. The primary and secondary pressures match the experimental result fairly well. The core uncover behavior and the CET temperature evolve the same as in the test. There was only a little delay in primary pressure compared to the test results. The data are shown normalized because they are proprietary until April 2012. Other groups participating in the OECD/NEA ROSA project also simulated this test and, in general, obtained good results. 3132 The results of OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 showed that the accident management action of manual depressurization in the secondary system was effective, but it was late, because the temperatures at the core increased In order to analyze the delay problem, the relationship between clad and CET temperature evolution could be approximated by the linear expression AT C ET = CAT CLAD -T 0 . This analysis was performed by JAERI with several experiments; see Refs. 34, 37, and 38. The adjustment obtained for the upper-head tests and the simulation with TRACE are included in Table III. The comparison of the slopes C shows that the simulation of OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 with TRACE provides larger values of the CET temperatures than the experimental ones. The ratio between the experimental and the simulated increase of CET during core uncovering in OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 is 0.65; see Fig. 12 . This value was obtained from several simulations with different nodalizations, in which the most conservative value (the lowest value) was chosen. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account this relationship in the plant applications that are described later in this paper. 
IV. ALMARAZ-1 TRACE MODEL
Almaraz NPP has two PWR units; it is located in Cáceres (Spain) and is owned by a consortium of three Spanish utilities: Iberdrola (53%), Endesa (36%), and Gas Natural Fenosa (11%). The commercial operation Regarding the primary and secondary circuits, the following components have been modeled:
1. reactor vessel, modeled by a VESSEL component (Fig. 15) , which includes the core region, guide tubes, support columns, core bypass, and the bypass to the vessel head via the downcomer and via guide tubes 2. The nuclear core power is modeled with axial cosine power shape distribution. The core power is distributed among nine HEAT STRUCTURE components, with one HEAT STRUCTURE per sector. The control, protection, and engineering safeguard systems and signals modeled are the following:
1. pressurizer level control, which includes the CVCS isolating discharge signal, the CVCS charge flow, and heaters 2. pressurizer pressure control, which includes proportional and backup heaters, spray lines, and pilotoperated relief valves (PORVs) 3. steam generator level control system 4. steam dump control 5. turbine control 6. protection and engineering safeguard system signals, which include the emergency shutdown system (SCRAM); safety injection; pressurizer safety valve logic; AFWS activation; relief, safety, and isolating valve logic of steam lines; normal feedwater system isolation; turbine trip; and pump trip.
This model has been validated with steady and transient conditions and verified with a large set of transients.
4451
In these kinds of transients, it is necessary to include the RVLIS to measure the water level in the reactor vessel as it is measured in the plant. In Almaraz-1 there are two calibrations: a dynamic calibration (with all RCPs running) and a static calibration (all RCPs tripped). A model for these RVLIS measures was implemented in the Almaraz-1 model taking into account the descriptions and model of several references: Refs. 52, 53, and 54. Figure 15 shows the relationship among several values of the RVLIS and heights in Almaraz-1 and as compared to the ROSA/LSTF vessel model.
V. UPPER-HEAD SBLOCA WITHOUT HPSI: REFERENCE CASE
In this first analysis the secondary-side cooling is not taken into account in order to check if it is necessary to avoid high cladding temperatures.
In this first group of simulations, several conditions were imposed in the model:
1. The break area is adjusted to the CRDM section of Almaraz-1 [6.985 cm (2.75 in.)].
No HPSI is available.
3. All accumulators are available (3/3).
One train of LPSI is available.
5. The main steam isolation valve is closed by high pressure inside containment.
6. There is no secondary-side depressurization.
7. An upper-head SBLOCA takes place at t = 4650 s.
There is no RCP trip.
The results show that the reference case needs secondaryside depressurization in order to avoid high cladding temperatures; see Figs. 16 and 17.
Therefore, we decided to perform a broad spectrum of sensitivity analyses with respect to several variables in order to find the most limiting cases: break area, discharge coefficient, break localization within the upper head, friction factors in the accumulators' exit, upper downcomer area, steady-state upper-head mass flows, number of accumulators available, and RCP trip delay.
The results of peak cladding temperature (PCT) sensitivity cases show the following: low sensitivity to break location, friction factors at the accumulators' exit, and steady-state upper-head mass flows; medium sensitivity to discharge coefficients and upper downcomer area; and high sensitivity with respect to break area size, RCP trip delay, and number of accumulators available.
Taking into account the results of the sensitivity analysis, we decided to carry out two analyses: first, an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the break area size and RCP trip delay (with all accumulators available)-Sees. VI, VII, and VIII-and second, a sensitivity analysis with respect to the number of accumulators availableSees. IX and X.
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO THE BREAK AREA SIZE AND RCP TRIP DELAY
An extensive analysis with respect to the break area size and RCP trip delay (with all accumulators available) was performed, as shown in Figs. 18, 19 , and 20. The results shown in Table IV These analyses confirm the necessity of secondaryside depressurization at 55 K/h cooling of the primary circuit in order to avoid core damage. Therefore, a new analysis including secondary-side depressurization was performed. This analysis is described in Sec. VII.
VII. UPPER-HEAD SBL0CA WITHOUT HPSI: CASES WITH RCS COOLING RATE OF 55 K/h
As was mentioned earlier, the operator follows EOP E-0, EOP E-l, and EOP ES-1.2 in this kind of sequence. In EOP E-l, step 11, the operator checks the primary pressure, and if it is not below 15 bars, there is a transition to EOP ES-1.2. In EOP ES-1.2, the operator will cool and depressurize the primary system, opening the relief valves in the secondary side, making sure to control that the primary cooling is close to 55 K/h. The time needed for the operators to arrive at EOP ES-1.2 is -600 s from reactor scram. 59 The simulations were performed including a manual cooling control system in the Almaraz-1 model. Several options of this manual control have been checked similar to the models described in Ref. 60 . After adjusting the parameters of all the manual control models, a proportional control was selected.
The results of these simulations are shown in Figs. 21 through 26. The condition of damage or success for all these transients is included in Fig. 27 . The region of and perform the 55 K/h primary-side cooling, there is no fuel damage. However, if there is an operator error related to inadequate manual operation, it is still possible that RCP trip will arrive at damage conditions. Therefore, a new analysis has been performed for the transients that lead to damage conditions, and it is described in Sec. VIII.
VIM. UPPER-HEAD SBLOCA WITHOUT HPSI: CASES WITH FULL OPENING OF RELIEF VALVES
In the damage transients discussed in Sec. VII, all the transients included the manual actions corresponding to EOP ES-1.2, like a primary-side cooling rate of 55 K/h. Some of the results of the previous damage transients with full opening of all secondary-side relief valves (3/3) at the time of EOP FR C.l transition (plus an assumed operator delay of 60 s) are shown in Figs. 31 and  32 . In all the cases, fully opening the relief valves avoids the damage limit, as shown in Fig. 31 .
However, the simulated CET temperature being higher than the real one during core uncovering, as is described in Sec. Ill, must be taken into account. Therefore, we decided to obtain the available time to fully open all of the secondary-side relief valves for all the cases arriving at core damage with 55 K/h secondary-side cooling and to compare this time with the corrected transition time to EOP FR C.l. The corrected transition time is obtained taking into account that the ratio between the experimental and the simulated CET temperature for OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 is 0.65; see Sec. Ill for more details. Therefore, if the values of the simulated CET temperatures are corrected, a new transition time to EOP FR C.l is obtained; see Table VI and Fig. 33 . The results show that there is a large margin of time between the corrected transition time to EOP FR C.l and the available time to begin EOP FR C.l. Therefore, these results also show that the present EOPs are adequate for this kind of transient, also in the case of an operator mistake related to an inadequate manual RCP trip.
These results have been obtained with the availability of all accumulators (3/3). In order to complete the analysis, a new sensitivity study with respect to the number of accumulators available was performed, as discussed in Sec. V.
IX. UPPER-HEAD SBLOCA WITHOUT HPSI: CASES WITH FULL OPENING OF RELIEF VALVES: SENSITIVITY TO THE NUMBER OF ACCUMULATORS AVAILABLE
In this sensitivity analysis the worst previous case with a cooling rate of 55 K/h was selected. This case corresponds to the sequence with a break size of 6.985 cm (2.75 in.) and RCP trip at the same time as the SBLOCA event, because the time between conditions for EOP FR C.l transition and core damage is the smallest of all cases; see Table V . The results shown in Fig. 34 show that all cases with three, two, one, and no accumulators lead to core damage. Therefore, the RVLIS and CET temperature shown in Figs. 35 and 36 are analyzed in order to obtain the transition times to EOP FR C.l; see In the previous sensitivity analysis with respect to the number of accumulators available, it was found that The transition time to EOP FR C.l can be obtained from the data shown in Table IX ; see Table X . These transition times point out that it is necessary to simulate only the transients corresponding to Modification 2 (Mod 2) and Modification 3 (Mod 3).
The results of Mod 2 and Mod 3 point out that Mod 2 gives better results than the current Status Tree F.0.2 (see Table XI ), but Mod 2 and Mod 3 do not avoid core damage for the case of no accumulators nor do they avoid core uncovering in the other cases; see Figs. 39 and 40. On the other hand better results are obtained with Mod 3 because core damage is avoided for the case of no accumulators; core uncovering is also avoided in the other cases; see Figs. 41 and 42. Therefore, the only modification of interest could be Mod 3, but one should take into account that this management action (three PORVs fully opened) is very aggressive and the cooling rate of the primary side could be very large. Additionally and according to some references, the operator behaviour must be conservative, and decisions must be based on more than just vessel level measurement; see Refs. 64 and 65 for more details on this issue.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions of this research are the following:
1. With the actual procedures (Westinghouse design), only the case with HPSI failed and no accumulators available could lead to core damage. This conclusion has been obtained taking into account the correction of the simulated CET temperatures. This correction has been performed considering the most conservative relationship among the experimental data and several simulated cases. This kind of conservative correction could avoid the necessity of more detailed codes.
2. Changing the RVLIS condition (from 40% to 70%) and eliminating the CET condition in the EOP FR C.l transition lead to better results than those with present transitions to EOP FR C.l. However, it should be taken into account that this management action (three PORVs fully opened) is very aggressive and the cooling rate of the primary side could be very large.
At present, it does not seem necessary to change Status Tree F.0.2 for the Westinghouse PWR design, because such change is useful only for SBLOCA accidents with HPSI failed and no accumulators available. Also, it must be taken into account that the full opening of three PORVs is a very aggressive management action and does not seem to be necessary in other accidents with higher probability, like SBLOCA with HPSI failed and one or more accumulators available.
